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An example of proactive control is the usage of informative cues to prepare for an upcom-
ing task. Here the authors will present data from a series of three experiments, showing
that positive affect along with low arousal reduces proactive control in form of a reduced
reliance on informative cues. In three affect groups, neutral or positive affective picture
stimuli with low and high arousal preceded every trial. In Experiments 1 and 2, using a
simple response cueing paradigm with informative cues (66% cue validity), a reduced cue
validity effect (CVE) was found under positive affect with low arousal.To test the robustness
of the effect and to see whether reactive control is also modulated by positive affect, Exper-
iment 3 used a cued task switching paradigm with predicitive cues (75% cue validity). As
expected, a reduced CVE was again found specifically in the positive affect condition with
low arousal, but only for task repetitions. Furthermore, there was no difference in switch
costs between affect groups (with and without task cues).Taken together, the reduced CVE
indicates that positive affect with low arousal reduces proactive control, while comparable
switch costs suggest that there is no influence of positive affect on reactive control.
Keywords: cognitive control, positive affect, arousal
INTRODUCTION
Studying issues of cognitive control is of major interest for the
understanding of human cognition and action. The dual mech-
anisms of control (DMC) framework by Braver and colleagues
(Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) suggests that cognitive con-
trol operates in two distinct modes, proactive control and reactive
control. Reactive control is assumed to be transiently activated
in a just-in-time manner as soon as a high interference event is
detected. In contrast, proactive control is supposed to be acti-
vated by the anticipation of upcoming interference. So, reactive
control serves as a “late correction” mechanism to solve inter-
ference after its onset, whereas proactive control serves to pre-
vent interference before it occurs. For this purpose, goal-relevant
information is actively sustained in preparation for an opti-
mized behavior in the upcoming cognitively demanding event.
The DMC framework further claims that successful cognition
relies on the variability of these two cognitive control functions,
and that various factors – intrapersonal, interpersonal, or situ-
ational – can lead to a bias in favor of one mode of control
strategy over the other. An example for such a biasing factor is
affect.
Dreisbach (2006), for example, investigated affective modula-
tions of cognitive control with an AX Continuous Performance
Task (AX-CPT). The author could show that specifically positive
affect and not negative affect – manipulated via pictures from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 1999)
preceding every trial – leads to a more flexible but also less stable
behavior. In the AX-CPT participants have to press a prespeci-
fied target response key to the target “X” but only if it follows the
cue “A.” If X follows another letter (e.g., B) or A is followed by
another letter than X (e.g., Y), the non-target response key has
to be pressed. Critically, the cue A is highly informative about
the occurrence of X (70% frequency of AX trials, whereas the
other trial types BX, AY, and BY occur with 10% frequency each),
therefore it can be assumed that in this task there is a strong
bias in favor of a proactive control strategy with active mainte-
nance of the cue information to optimize performance. Likewise,
the cue B is also very informative, as it unequivocally predicts a
non-target response. Dreisbach (2006) found improved perfor-
mance in AY trials, but worsened performance in BX and BY trials
under positive affect. This result was interpreted as evidence for
a reduced maintenance of the cue, because subjects in the posi-
tive group showed costs when a to be maintained goal had to be
executed (BX and BY trials; less stability) and benefits when a to
be maintained goal unexpectedly changed (AY trials; more flex-
ibility). According to the DMC framework (Braver et al., 2007;
Braver, 2012), these results might provide evidence that proac-
tive control is reduced under positive affect, because there is less
usage of the cue to prepare the upcoming task (see also Compton
et al., 2004). The increased flexibility, as indicated by the better
performance on AY trials under positive affect, however, might as
well be interpreted in terms of increased reactive control. In line
with this interpretation, a recent study (van Wouwe et al., 2011) –
also using the AX-CPT, but manipulating affect via emotional film
clips before the actual experiment – more directly addressed the
question whether positive affect influences proactive or reactive
control by including measures of event related potentials (ERP).
In line with the Dreisbach (2006) study, they found improved
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behavioral performance in AY trials, that is, on trials on which
a cue-induced response tendency has to be overcome. However,
unlike the previous study, the authors did not find impairment
in BX and BY trials, where the cue unequivocally announced the
non-target response. Based on these behavioral results and the
supporting ERP data, van Wouwe et al. (2011) concluded that
cue usage, and hence proactive control, did not differ between
their positive and neutral group but that, instead, reactive con-
trol as soon as the target stimulus appeared was enhanced under
positive affect. Considering these mixed results so far, one aim
of the present study is to further clarify whether positive affect
modulates proactive or reactive control. One obvious difference
between both studies might be the specific mood induction pro-
cedure (namely, IAPS pictures vs. film clips). Related to that, it
is conceivable that different arousal levels in the positive affect
groups of both studies might account for the different results as
arousal is an inherent and variable but often neglected feature
of affect (Russell, 1980; Posner et al., 2005). Furthermore, arousal
differences might help to explain the mixed results found in the lit-
erature so far. To our knowledge, there is only one study (Vogt et al.,
2008) that shows that highly arousing affective stimuli increase the
cue validity effect (CVE) of informative cues. This study, however,
investigated attentional allocation to affective stimuli as it used
these affective stimuli as cues in a spatial cueing task. Therefore,
that study showed that highly arousing affective stimuli can attract
and bind attention, but it could not answer whether or not affec-
tive arousal influences the reliance on neutral informative cues.
Thus, another aim of the present study was to explore the role of
arousal on positive affect effects, when affect is not confounded
with the cues.
In sum, following the results of the previous study from our lab
(Dreisbach, 2006) we wanted to show that positive affect with sim-
ilar (low) arousal levels as used before reduces proactive control in
form of a reduced usage of informative cues. This positive affect
group (positivelow hereafter) was compared to a neutral control
group and another positive affect group with higher arousal levels
(positivehigh hereafter). In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a spatial
response cueing task with spatially congruent target response map-
pings. A bias in favor of a proactive control strategy was induced
by using informative cues, that is, the probability of validly cued
trials was more than 50% but less than 100%. In this response cue-
ing task, a peripheral, informative cue indicated a possible target
location and thereby primed the congruent response. Further-
more, the higher probability of valid cues (66%) should promote
the usage of a proactive control strategy resulting in a reliable
CVE, that is, faster responses and fewer errors in validly cued tri-
als. A reduction of proactive control should consequently reduce
the CVE, because less usage of the cues would minimize the ben-
efits in validly cued trials as well as the costs in invalidly cued
trials.
For more direct evidence that specifically proactive control and
not reactive control is influenced by positive affect, Experiment 3
used a task switching paradigm. Comparing task switching per-
formance with and without informative task cues enabled the
investigation of affective influences on reactive control (as mea-
sured by switch costs) and proactive control (as measured by the
CVE) in a single experiment.
EXPERIMENT 1
Following previous results (Compton et al., 2004; Dreisbach, 2006)
we expected to find a decrease in proactive control in form of a
reduced CVE in the positivelow group as compared to the neu-
tral group in the response cueing task with informative cues of
Experiment 1. Because arousal differences were not considered
in previous studies1 or were confounded with the cues (Vogt
et al., 2008) we had no a priori expectations concerning different
outcomes in the positivelow and positivehigh group.
METHOD
Participants
Sixty-six undergraduate students of Regensburg University par-
ticipated in the experiment for course credit or 5 Euro. Sixty-two
subjects (see Results for exclusion criteria) were included into the
final data analysis (Mean age= 24.13 years,SD= 3.95, range= 20–
38, 53 female). Participants were assigned randomly to the three
affect groups (19 neutral, 21 positivelow, 22 positivehigh). All par-
ticipants signed informed consent and were debriefed after the
session.
Apparatus and stimuli
A computer with a 17′′-monitor (display resolution at 1024× 768
pixel), running E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Sharps-
burg, USA) was used for experiment presentation and data acqui-
sition. Viewing distance was held constant at 50 cm by using a chin
rest. Responses were collected via a QWERTZ-keyboard, with the
y- and m-key serving as left and right response keys.
To be able to manipulate valence and arousal independently we
used pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1999) as affect induction
procedure. These pictures are known to reliably elicit specific affec-
tive reactions even with short presentation durations (Codispoti
et al., 2009), and the elicited emotional reactions maintain and
even sensitize – but do not habituate – with repetitive exposure
to pictures of the same valence (Bradley et al., 1996; Smith et al.,
2005). For each affect condition we chose 10 pictures: The neutral
picture set had medium valence levels (M = 4.99), and low arousal
levels (M = 2.45), whereas both positive picture sets were high in
valence (M positivelow= 7.99; M positivehigh= 7.25) but differed
in arousal levels (M positivelow= 4.55; M positivehigh= 6.30).
Neutral pictures included household objects like plates or cups,
positivelow pictures showed babies and families, and in the
positivehigh group sport and adventure pictures were displayed.
It should be noted, that no erotica were used in the positivehigh
group to prevent different gender influences, and because erotica
seem to be a special category with effects differing from non-sexual
positive, highly arousing pictures (Most et al., 2007). All pictures
were presented in landscape format and color, adjusted to a size of
800× 600 pixel, and positioned centered on a gray background.
The fixation cross, cue and target were all displayed in black ink
and bold on gray background. The fixation cross was presented at
the center of the screen in font size 32 pt. The target (a single dot)
and the cue (the “§”-symbol) appeared 8.64 cm to the left or right
of the fixation cross in font size 55 pt.
1Note that in Dreisbach (2006) negative IAPS pictures were chosen to match the
arousal levels of the positive affect pictures.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition July 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 265 | 2
Fröber and Dreisbach Positive affect modulates proactive control
Procedure
Each trial started with the presentation of the fixation cross for
500 ms, followed by an IAPS picture for 350 ms. After another
short fixation period (200 ms) the cue was presented left or right
of the fixation cross for 200 ms. The target appeared after a vari-
able inter stimulus interval of 50 or 150 ms, which was included to
reduce premature responses to the cue, and remained visible until
the participant pressed the spatially congruent response key. Par-
ticipants were instructed to react as fast as possible while avoiding
errors. In case of an error, the German word for error (“Fehler”)
was presented for 1000 ms as feedback.
To assure that all participants started with a similar mood, all
participants passed a 5-min relaxation exercise – comprised of
relaxing music and spoken instructions for muscle relaxation –
prior to the actual experiment. These instructions were standard-
ized mp3-files presented via stereo headphones. Subsequently, 12
practice trials without IAPS pictures enabled the participants to
get used to the cueing task. These practice trials were followed by
two experimental blocks, in which an IAPS picture preceded every
trial. Both blocks consisted of 120 trials (80 valid and 40 invalid),
separated by a short break. The trial procedure within each block
was pseudo-random: Each block consisted of 10 sequences of 12
trials and within these 12 trials the only constraint was that cues
and targets appeared equally often on the left and the right side.
Affective pictures were drawn from the set of the picture pool at
random without replacement until all pictures had been presented
once and then the procedure started all over again.
Design
A 3 (affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Cue valid-
ity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors design was used. Affect was
manipulated between, and Cue validity varied within participants.
RESULTS
Data analysis
The practice trials as well as the first trial of each experimental
block were excluded from analyses. In addition, error trials, tri-
als following an error, and trials with reaction times (RT) below
150 ms or above 1500 ms were excluded (4.31% of the data). Fur-
thermore, RTs differing more than 3 SD from individual means
were considered as outliers and also removed prior analysis (1.21%
of the trials). The data of two participants were excluded from fur-
ther analyses, because of too many errors (individual mean error
rates 11 and 14% while overall error rate was 2.23%). Another two
subjects had to be excluded due to untypical RTs throughout the
experiment. One was exceptionally slow (M = 492 ms) in com-
parison to mean RTs of his affect group (M positivelow= 344 ms),
and the other participant got continuously slower throughout the
experiment and also had high mean RTs (M = 411 ms, while M
neutral= 349 ms). Of the remaining data, mean RTs and error
rates of each design cell (see Table 1) were entered into a 3 (Affect:
neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Cue validity: valid vs.
invalid) mixed factors analysis of variance (ANOVA).2
Error data, overall analysis
The overall ANOVA for the error data brought up a main effect of
Cue validity, F(1, 59)= 90.35, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.605. Fewer errors
were made in valid than invalid trials (0.17 vs. 4.27%). The main
effect Affect, F(2, 59)= 2.68, p= 0.077,η2p = 0.083, , did not prove
reliable. But we found a significant interaction of Affect×Cue
validity, F(2, 59)= 3.45, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.105. Planned compar-
isons showed a reduced CVE in the positivelow group compared to
the positivehigh group (F = 6.73, p< 0.05). The CVE in the neutral
group was descriptively between both positive groups, but did not
differ significantly from either group (Fs< 2.51, ps> 0.118). The
overall error rate was 2.23% (SD= 1.85).
RT data, overall analysis
We found a significant main effect of Cue validity, F(1, 59)= 88.86,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.601. Participants responded significantly faster
after valid than after invalid trials (328 vs. 363 ms), resulting in an
overall CVE of 35 ms. The main effect of affect as well as the inter-
action of Affect×Cue validity did not prove reliable (all F < 2.08,
all p> 0.133). Even though we did not find a significant interac-
tion of Affect×Cue validity in the RT analysis, the descriptive data
resembles the results found in error rates (see Figure 1). CVE was
smallest in the positivelow group (25 ms), intermediate in the neu-
tral group (35 ms), and largest in the positivehigh group (43 ms).
2Although previous studies (Compton et al., 2004; Dreisbach, 2006) already indi-
cated a valence specific effect, we still included two negative affect groups – one
with low and one with high arousal – in Experiment 1 to disentangle valence and
arousal effects on proactive control. It turned out that negative affect in combi-
nation with high arousal led to a general increase in RT compared to the neutral
group and both positive groups (Fs> 4.13, ps< 0.05). Both negative groups showed
greater cue validity effects than the positivelow group (M negativehigh= 46 ms, M
negativelow= 37 ms, M positivelow= 25 ms). There was no significant interaction
of negative affect with low or high arousal and cue validity. The negative groups
therefore contributed no information concerning the special topic of anticipation
(and the special topic of this Frontiers issue). To enhance the readability of the
present article results of the negative groups are therefore not presented here but
can be reported on request.




Valid Invalid Valid Invalid Valid Invalid
RT (SD) 332 (21.4) 367 (35.5) 332 (33.3) 357 (40.69) 320 (26.0) 363 (43.9)
Errors (SD) 0.24 (0.38) 4.11 (3.1) 0.19 (0.3) 3.05 (3.16) 0.09 (0.23) 5.64 (3.95)
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FIGURE 1 | Mean cue validity effects (CVE) in the spatial response cueing
task of Experiment 1 as a function of Affect group. The (A) represents CVE
differences in error rates (in %), the (B) represents CVE differences in RTs (in
ms). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean.
Because the neutral group was more of a descriptive baseline –
it differed on both valance and arousal levels from the positive
groups – we conducted an additional analysis without the neu-
tral group to search more directly for a possible arousal effect on
proactive control.
Arousal effect, positivelow vs. positivehigh
A 2 (Arousal: positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Cue validity: valid vs.
invalid) mixed factors ANOVA revealed a significant main effect
of Cue validity, F(1, 41)= 54.19, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.569. Partici-
pants responded faster after valid trials (326 vs. 360 ms), resulting
in a CVE of 34 ms. The interaction of Arousal×Cue validity,
F(1, 41)= 3.74, p= 0.059, η2p = 0.084, was on the threshold of
significance. Therefore, we additionally calculated the JZS-Bayes
factor (Rouder et al., 2009), which gives information about the
probability of a hypothesis conditionally on observed data. JZS-
Bayes factor was 0.895, which means that there is indeed some
evidence in favor of a difference in CVEs between positivelow
and positivehigh group. The main effect of Arousal did not prove
reliable (F < 1, p= 0.787).
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 resulted in preliminary evidence for a reduction of
proactive control under positive affect. The positivelow group had
the smallest CVE, an effect that was significant in the error data and
just at the threshold of significance in the RT data. Interestingly, the
CVE was increased in the positivehigh group indicating an increase
of proactive control under positive affect with high arousal. How-
ever, there were only descriptive but no statistically significant
differences between the neutral group and either positive group.
Experiment 2 was run to collect more empirical support for the
modulation of the CVE by positive affect with differing arousal
levels.
EXPERIMENT 2
We used a very simple response cueing task in Experiment 1, which
resulted in very fast overall RTs (M = 345 ms) and a low overall
error rate (2.23%). Therefore, marginally significant differences
between groups might be due to a floor effect. To increase variance
and thereby provide room for affective modulations, we increased
task difficulty in Experiment 2. To assure that both experiments
were still comparable we used the same cueing task with infor-
mative cues (66% Cue validity) in combination with a concurrent
math task. Based on the results of Experiment 1 we expected to
find a reduced CVE in the positivelow group, but an increased CVE
in the positivehigh group, compared to the neutral group.
METHOD
Participants
Another 60 students of Regensburg University participated in the
experiment for course credit or 5 Euro. Fifty-five subjects (see
Results for exclusion criteria) were included into the final data
analysis (Mean age= 22.86 years, SD= 3.79, range= 19–45, 40
female). Participants were assigned randomly to the three Affect
groups (18 neutral, 19 positivelow, 18 positivehigh). All participants
signed informed consent and were debriefed after the session.
Apparatus and stimuli
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1 except for
the numbers presented in the math task. The numbers 1–5 were
presented centrally, in black ink and in size 32 pt. Responses in the
math task had to be typed in with the number keys of the first row
of the keyboard.
Procedure
Procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1 with
the following exceptions: First, in each trial of the cueing task the
first fixation was replaced by random numbers 1–5 for 800 ms.
These numbers were part of the additional math task. Participants
performed the cueing task, and at the same time had to add up
the random numbers. Every 12 trials subjects were asked to type
in the result of the summation task, which was followed by an
informative feedback (3500 ms). Second, the actual experiment
was preceded by a math test to assure that the Affect groups did
not differ according to their calculating skills. To this end, we used
a subtest of the Leistungsprüfsystem (a German IQ-test; L-P-S,
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Horn, 1983), which requires adding up lines of 10 random num-
bers from 2 to 9 under speeded conditions and is therefore similar
to the actual experimental situation. And third, because of the
increased task difficulty we added additional practice blocks. The
first block comprised 12 trials of the spatial response cueing task.
The next practice block (24 trials) introduced the math task in
addition to the response cueing task. It included two complete
math task cycles of 12 trials with feedback. In a final practice block
(12 trials) an IAPS picture preceded every cueing trial. Data acqui-
sition took part in the following three experimental blocks with
120 trials each (80 valid and 40 invalid trials, 10 math task cycles
per block).
Design
A 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Cue
validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors design was used. Affect




We checked for group differences in calculating skills before the
experiment and during the experiment with an ANOVA on per-
formance in the L-P-S subtest as well as in the additional math
task. For analysis of error rates and RTs in the cueing task, trials
with math task responses differing more than two from the correct
result were excluded from analysis (6.31% of the data).3 Further
preprocessing was the same as in Experiment 1, which resulted
in the exclusion of another 6.83% of the trials. Furthermore one
participant of the neutral group was excluded because he did not
follow the instructions. Also two subjects of the positivelow group
had to be excluded. The first made too many errors in the math
task (76.7%, while mean error rate was 14.7%), and the second
made too many errors in the cueing task (14.8%, while mean error
rate was 1.3%). Finally, two participants of the positivehigh group
were excluded from further analysis, because they were exception-
ally slow (715 and 894 ms, while mean RTs were 448 ms). Of the
3We wanted to be sure that participants were truly engaged with both the response
cueing task and the additional math task. Therefore, we controlled for performance
in the math task. But we chose a rather moderate criterion (correct response ±2)
to minimize data loss, because exclusion due to math task performance meant to
exclude a complete cycle of 12 cueing trials. With an absolute criterion (only cor-
rect responses included) 17.7% of all trials would have been excluded. By using the
moderate criterion, we aimed to include all trials where participants genuinely tried
to follow instructions.
remaining data, mean RTs and error rates of each design cell (see
Table 2) were entered in to a 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow
vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed factors
ANOVA.
Math performance
There were no differences in the performance in the L-P-S sub-
test between Affect groups before the experiment, F(2, 52)= 2.62,
p= 0.082, η2p = 0.092. Also, no significant differences between the
three Affect groups were found in the additional math task during
the experiment (F < 1, p= 0.395).
Error data, overall analysis
The overall error rate was 1.3% (SD= 1.5), and individual mean
error rates were below 7.5% for all subjects. The overall ANOVA
for the error data brought up a main effect of Cue validity, F(1,
52)= 36.63, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.413, with fewer errors in valid than
in invalid trials (0.10 vs. 2.51%). The main effect affect as well
as the interaction of Affect×Cue validity did not prove reliable
(Fs< 1.37, ps> 0.263).
RT data, overall analysis
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Cue validity,
F(1, 52)= 142.39, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.732. Participants responded
significantly faster after valid than after invalid trials (418 vs.
478 ms), resulting in an overall CVE of 60 ms. More importantly,
we found a significant interaction of Affect×Cue validity, F(2,
52)= 3.51, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.119, which is depicted in Figure 2.
Planned comparisons showed a reduced CVE in the positivelow
group (41 ms) as compared to the neutral group (72 ms; F = 5.49,
p< 0.05) and the positivehigh group (70 ms; F = 4.94, p< 0.05).
There was no significant difference between neutral group and
positivehigh group (F < 1,p= 0.904). Also, the main effect of Affect
was not significant (F < 1, p= 0.578).
DISCUSSION
An increase in mean RTs from Experiment 1 to 2 (345 vs. 437 ms)
indicates that we succeeded in increasing task difficulty. With
this adapted paradigm we found clear-cut evidence of a reduced
CVE in the positivelow group compared to the neutral and the
positivehigh group. This suggests that specifically positive affect
with low arousal reduces proactive control in form of a reduced
reliance on informative cues. In contrast to a proactive control
strategy, participants in the positivelow group show behavioral
costs in expected events (valid trials) and benefits in unexpected




Valid Invalid Valid Invalid Valid Invalid
RT (SD) 405 (77.6) 477 (105.8) 445 (111.9) 487 (111.2) 401 (60.3) 471 (90.7)
Errors (SD) 0.21 (0.33) 3.32 (3.61) 0.09 (0.18) 1.86 (2.38) 0.0 (0.0) 2.35 (2.84)
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FIGURE 2 | Mean Cue validity effects (in ms) in the spatial response
cueing task of Experiment 2 as a function of Affect group. Error bars
represent 1 standard error of the mean.
events (invalid trials). A problem in our simple cueing paradigm
is, however, that we cannot completely rule out that the reduced
CVE might also be a sign of increased reactive control: partic-
ipants in the positivelow group might have used the cues just
as the other affect groups but they might have been better able
to overcome the pre-activated response in invalidly cued tri-
als. This would be in line with the results by van Wouwe et al.
(2011) that showed an enhancement in reactive control but no
influence of positive affect on proactive control. To rule out
this alternative explanation, we conducted an additional con-
trol experiment, using again a response cueing paradigm but
this time employing non-informative cues.4 With this modifi-
cation, participants could not optimize their performance with
a proactive control strategy. Again, we found a significant CVE,
F(1, 56)= 474.0, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.894, but no affective modu-
lation thereof (F = 1.13, p= 0.330). JZS-Bayes factors for CVE
comparisons between the affect groups (neutral, positivelow, and
4We tested 59 subjects (20 neutral, 20 positivelow, and 19 positivehigh) in the cueing
experiment with non-informative cues (50% validity). Stimuli and procedure were
basically the same as in Experiment 1 except for the following changes: The fixa-
tion cross as well as the two possible target locations were always enclosed by black
bordered boxes (size 100× 100 pixels). As a cue the border of one peripheral box
changed border width from 1 to 5 pt. The stimulus onset asynchrony between cue
and target was changed to 50 or 150 ms, which was shorter than in Experiment 1 but
equaled the inter stimulus interval of Experiment 1. Furthermore, the cue remained
on screen with the target until the participant pressed a response key, and the cue
validity percentage was reduced to 50%, which resulted in 60 valid and 60 invalid
trials per block. All these changes were made to induce a bias in favor of a reactive
control strategy. Mean error rate was 1.26% and mean RTs were 339 ms. Mean CVE
were comparable in all affect groups with 40 ms in the neutral group, 43 ms in the
positivelow group, and 35 ms in the positivehigh group.
positivehigh) ranged from 1.66 to 3.75, which means the null
hypothesis – no difference in CVE – was indeed more likely. So,
in sum the results of the response cueing experiments speak in
favor of an affective modulation of proactive control only, with a
reduced reliance on informative cues under positive affect with low
arousal. However, it would be even better proof, if we could show
that the affective modulation of the CVE is restricted to proac-
tive control and is not present for reactive control in a unique
experiment. Therefore, we conducted Experiment 3.
EXPERIMENT 3
The main aim of Experiment 3 was to gather more direct evi-
dence that specifically proactive control and not reactive control
is influenced by positive affect. Furthermore, we wanted to know,
whether the affective modulation of proactive control can also be
found for task cues (instead of response cues, as was the case with
the response cueing paradigm used here and the AX-CPT in previ-
ous studies). To address these issues we employed a task switching
paradigm. Task switching (for recent reviews, see, e.g., Kiesel et al.,
2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010) with univalent stimuli (e.g.,
digits and letters) is well suited to investigate reactive control in
form of differences in switch costs. Using univalent stimuli (a given
stimulus is only associated with one of the two possible tasks) and
no precues, variations in switch costs can be taken as a direct
indicator for reactive control processes. Furthermore, it has been
shown that participants are generally very sensitive to probabil-
ity cues (i.e., informative, but not 100% valid) in task switching
(Dreisbach et al., 2002; Hübner et al., 2004; Miniussi et al., 2005;
Dreisbach and Haider, 2006; Wendt et al., under review). There-
fore, a cued task switching paradigm with valid and invalid cues
allows not only the investigation of reactive control but also proac-
tive control in form of differences in the CVE (like in Experiments
1 and 2). Thus, in Experiment 3 we used a task switching paradigm
with a digit and a letter task that started without task cues. After
the first experimental block without precues, informative task cues
with a Cue validity of 75% preceded each trial. If positive affect
with low arousal reduces proactive control – as Experiments 1 and
2 suggest – we should again find a reduced CVE. If positive affect,
however, increases reactive control we should find a reduction of
switch costs – especially so in blocks without precues.
METHOD
Participants
Sixty undergraduate students from the Regensburg University (age
M = 22.53 years, SD= 4.02, range= 18–36, 53 female) partici-
pated in the experiment for course credit or 5 Euro. Participants
were assigned randomly to the three affect groups (20 positivelow,
20 positivehigh, 20 neutral). All participants signed informed con-
sent and were debriefed after the session. Because we were inter-
ested in a possible modulation of the switch costs, participants
with negative switch costs were excluded and replaced (two in the
neutral, three in the positivelow, and two in the positivehigh group).
Apparatus and stimuli
Apparatus was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. Also the same
IAPS picture sets were used for the three affect groups.
Eight digits (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9) written in green and eight
letters (A, E, O, U, C, K, G, and T) written in purple served as target
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stimuli and were presented at the center of the screen in font size
52. The color coding of the digit and letter task was counter bal-
anced across participants. Odd numbers and vowels were always
assigned to one response key, even numbers and consonants to the
other, while response mapping to the left and right response key
(y- and m-key on a QWERTZ-keyboard) was also counterbalanced
between participants. In experimental blocks 2–4, a color coded
fixation cross (purple or green) served as informative task cue.
Procedure
The experiment comprised one task switching block without task
cues followed by three blocks including informative task cues. In
the first block each trial started with an IAPS picture (350 ms)
followed by a blank screen (150 ms) and a black fixation cross
(1000 ms). Then the target stimulus appeared and remained on
screen until the participant responded. Subjects had to decide
whether a number was odd or even (digit task) or whether a
letter was a vowel or consonant (letter task). Participants were
instructed to react as fast as possible while avoiding errors. Feed-
back was given for errors only (2000 ms), each trial ended with
an intertrial interval of 500 ms. Procedure in the following blocks
with informative task cues was the same as in the first block except
that the fixation cross was now color coded and served as a task
cue for the following task. In valid trials (75% of all trials) the col-
ored fixation cross was followed by a target stimulus in the same
color, thereby enabling the preparation of the upcoming task in a
proactive manner. In contrast, in invalid trials (25% of all trials)
the fixation color incorrectly predicted the upcoming target color,
and can therefore mislead to prepare the wrong task.
The experiment started with the same relaxation exercise that
was used before in Experiments 1 and 2. Subsequently, 16 prac-
tice trials (random presentation of all target stimuli) without IAPS
pictures enabled the participants to get used to the task switching
procedure. This practice block was followed by 64 trials with an
IAPS picture preceding every trial. Data acquisition took place in
the following four experimental blocks – the first without infor-
mative task cues – with 128 trials each. Each block contained
64 digit tasks (4× 8 numbers) and 64 letter tasks (4× 8 letters).
Stimulus presentation was pseudo-randomized with the follow-
ing constraints: repeat and switch trials were evenly distributed.
Immediate repetitions of target stimuli or IAPS pictures were not
allowed. Task cues (96 valid, 32 invalid) were counterbalanced
across all trial types.
Design
A 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Trial type:
repeat vs. switch) design with affect as between and Trial type
as within factor was used in the first block without task cues.
The experimental blocks including informative task cues had a 3
(Affect)× 3 (Block: 2 vs. 3 vs. 4)× 2 (Trial type)× 2 (Cue validity:
valid vs. invalid) repeated measures design.
RESULTS
Data analysis
Practice trials as well as the first trial of each experimental block
were excluded from analyses. In addition, error trials, trials fol-
lowing an error, and trials with RTs differing more than 3 SD from
individual means were also removed prior analysis (9.34% of all
trials). Separate analyses were conducted for task switching perfor-
mance (mean error rates and RTs) in the first experimental block
without task cues and for performance in experimental blocks 2–4
with informative task cues.
Task switching performance, block 1 without task cues
Mean RTs (see Table 3) were entered into a 3 (Affect: neutral
vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Trial type: repeat vs. switch)
mixed factors ANOVA. We found a significant main effect of
Trial type, F(1, 57)= 106.45, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.651, with faster
responses in repeat trials (655 vs. 733 ms). The main effect of
Affect as well as the interaction of Affect×Trial type did not
prove reliable (all F < 1.97, all p> 0.150). The same analysis
for mean error rates (see Table 3) also resulted in a significant
main effect of Trial type, F(1, 57)= 26.82, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.319,
with less errors in repeat trials (2.28 vs. 5.97%). Again, no sig-
nificant Affect effects were found (all F < 1.19, all p> 0.31).
JZS-Bayes factors for differences in switch costs between the
Affect groups ranged from 2.95 to 4.04, which means that it is
more likely that there are indeed equal switch costs in all three
groups.
Task switching performance, blocks 2–4 with informative task cues
To check the effectiveness of the cues over time, we conducted a 3
(Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 3 (Block: 2 vs. 3
vs. 4)× 2 (Trial type: repeat vs. switch)× 2 (Cue validity: valid vs.
invalid) mixed factors ANOVA for the three experimental blocks
with informative task cues (see Tables 4 and 5 for mean RTs and
error rates). The analysis of mean error rates resulted in signifi-
cant main effects of Block, F(2,114)= 8.65, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.072,
Trial type, F(1, 57)= 37.34, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.397, and Cue valid-
ity, F(1, 57)= 4.40, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.072, as well as an interaction
of Trial type×Cue validity, F(1, 57)= 4.19, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.069.
Planned comparisons showed significantly more errors in Block 2
(3.61%) as compared to Block 3 (2,81%, F(1, 57)= 7.97, p< 0.01)
and Block 4 (2.42%, F(1, 57)= 14.20, p< 0.001). Blocks 3 and 4
did not differ significantly (F = 2.01, p= 0.162). Cue validity had
no significant influence an error rates in task repetitions (2.09
vs. 2.12%, F < 1, p= 0.915), but there was a significant negative
CVE in task switches (F(1,57)= 6.41, p< 0.05) with more errors
in valid trials (4.30 vs. 3.27%). The interaction of Block and Trial
type did not prove reliable (F = 2.82, p= 0.064). There was no sig-
nificant main effect of Affect or significant interactions with affect
(all F < 1.68, all p> 0.185). In the RT analysis we found significant
main effects for Block, F(2, 114)= 19.83, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.258,
Trial type, F(1, 57)= 98.88, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.634, and Cue valid-
ity, F(1, 57)= 19.53, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.255, which were further
qualified by a significant three-way interaction of these factors,
F(2, 114)= 11.28, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.165. Planned comparisons
showed a significant interaction of Trial type×Cue validity specif-
ically in the first block with informative task cues, F(1, 57)= 2.54,
p< 0.001 (Blocks 3 and 4: all F < 0.07, all p> 0.41). Further
analysis of Block 2 showed a significant CVE with faster RTs
after valid cues in repeat trials (590 vs. 644 ms, F(1, 57)= 32.28,
p< 0.001), but not in switch trials (667 vs. 659 ms, F = 1.32,
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Table 3 | Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (in %) in the in the first experimental block of experiment 3 (task switching without task cues) as a
function of Affect group andTrial type.
Affect group
Neutral Positivelow Positivehigh
Repeat Switch Repeat Switch Repeat Switch
RT (SD) 646 (76.9) 731 (116.7) 705 (170.5) 774 (202.0) 615 (96.9) 693 (133.5)
Errors (SD) 2.7 (2.89) 5.89 (4.68) 1.52 (2.09) 4.83 (3.72) 2.64 (2.73) 7.18 (8.19)
Table 4 | Mean RTs (in ms, SD in parentheses) in experimental blocks 2–4 of Experiment 3 (task switching with informative task cues) as a
function of Affect group,Trial type, and Cue validity.
Cue Affect group
Neutral Positivelow Positivehigh
Repeat Switch Repeat Switch Repeat Switch
BLOCK 2
Valid 568 (81.1) 639 (133.9) 588 (61.1) 661 (83.4) 615 (119.9) 702 (142.4)
Invalid 613 (111.9) 626 (92.3) 617 (103.2) 665 (92.9) 702 (176.9) 685 (125.63)
BLOCK 3
Valid 561 (73.4) 617 (110.2) 590 (91.9) 648 (105.5) 600 (99.8) 665 (141.0)
Invalid 558 (82.7) 643 (151.9) 600 (104.3) 654 (125.5) 603 (123.3) 656 (124.0)
BLOCK 4
Valid 557 (86.8) 595 (108.1) 566 (71.4) 608 (140.0) 591 (102.5) 635 (133.8)
Invalid 567 (109.2) 631 (151.1) 579 (81.2) 645 (140.0) 602 (115.6) 631 (126.9)
Table 5 | Mean error rates (in %, SD in parentheses) in experimental blocks 2–4 of experiment 3 (task switching with informative task cues) as a
function of Affect group,Trial type, and Cue validity.
Cue Affect group
Neutral Positivelow Positivehigh
Repeat Switch Repeat Switch Repeat Switch
BLOCK 2
Valid 2.76 (2.3) 5.55 (4.7) 2.27 (2.0) 4.89 (4.6) 1.87 (2.1) 4.88 (4.0)
Invalid 2.29 (3.7) 5.67 (4.8) 2.5 (4.8) 3.17 (4.6) 2.5 (5.5) 5.01 (5.3)
BLOCK 3
Valid 2.27 (2.8) 4.62 (5.6) 2.39 (3.4) 4.44 (4.6) 1.67 (2.8) 4.15 (3.9)
Invalid 1.91 (3.2) 2.96 (4.2) 2.15 (3.3) 2.28 (4.0) 2.15 (3.9) 2.73 (5.2)
BLOCK 4
Valid 1.7 (2.3) 4.2 (3.8) 2.39 (2.7) 2.8 (2.5) 1.52 (2.0) 3.2 (3.3)
Invalid 2.95 (3.6) 1.96 (3.2) 0.59 (2.6) 2.49 (4.2) 2.06 (4.4) 3.21 (4.9)
p= 0.26). So, there was a strong cueing effect only in the first
block with informative task cues, and specifically in repeat tri-
als. The main effect of Affect as well as all other interactions did
not prove reliable (all F < 3.36, all p> 0.067). With respect to
our hypotheses, also in these blocks with informative task cues
the Affect groups did not differ significantly in switch costs (M
neutral= 54 ms, M positivelow= 57 ms, M positivehigh= 44 ms).
JZS-Bayes factors for single comparisons of switch costs ranged
from 2.46 to 4.24, which further supports that switch costs were
indeed comparable in all three groups. Since we were inter-
ested in the affective modulation of the CVE, we reran the
analysis, this time only including Block 2 (i.e., the first block
with informative task cues), the only block where the CVE was
significant.
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Affect effects, first task switching block with informative task cues
only
A 3 (Affect: neutral vs. positivelow vs. positivehigh)× 2 (Trial
type: repeat vs. switch)× 2 (Cue validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed
factors ANOVA revealed significant main effects for Trial type,
F(1, 57)= 39.46, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.409, and Cue validity, F(1,
57)= 18.07, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.241. Participants responded faster
in repeat trials (617 vs. 663 ms) as well as in valid trials (629
vs. 651 ms). Furthermore, we found a significant interaction of
Trial type×Cue validity, F(1, 57)= 22.54, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.283.
Planned comparisons showed a significant CVE in repeat trials
(590 vs. 644 ms, F(1, 57)= 32.28, p< 0.001), but not in switch
trials (667 vs. 659 ms, F = 1.32, p= 0.26). Most important with
respect to our hypothesis, there was a significant interaction
of Affect×Trial type×Cue validity, F(2, 57)= 3.08, p= 0.05,
η2p = 0.098, which is depicted in Figure 3. CVE was significantly
smaller in the positivelow compared to the positivehigh group (29
vs. 87 ms, F(1, 57)= 6.32, p< 0.05). The CVE in the neutral group
(45 ms) was descriptively between both positive groups but did not
differ significantly from either group (Fs< 3.35, ps> 0.072). The
main effect Affect and all other interactions did not prove reli-
able (all F < 1.94, all p> 0.15). The same analysis for mean error
rates resulted only in a significant main effect of Trial type, F(1,
57)= 25.06, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.306, with less errors in repeat trials
(2.36 vs. 4.86%). No further significant main effects or interactions
were found (all F < 1, all p> 0.47).
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 3 switch costs did not differ between affect groups,
neither in the first experimental block without task cues nor in the
following blocks with informative cues. Strong cueing effects were
found only in the first block with informative task cues and specif-
ically in repeat trials. In this block we also found an affect effect
similar to the results of Experiments 1 and 2: the CVE in repeat
trials was reduced in the positivelow group as compared to the pos-
itive high group, while the CVE was descriptively in between both
positive groups in the neutral group. It is not surprising that we
found an affective modulation only in Block 2, because block wise
analysis of all three blocks including cues showed that the infor-
mative task cues only had an impact on performance while they
were new, whereas their influence diminished with more practice
in the task (RTs and error rates declined throughout the experi-
ment, see Tables 4 and 5). The generally reduced reliance on cues
over blocks might be due to the fact that the task cues were nei-
ther necessary (because univalent stimuli were used) nor entirely
useful (e.g., Sudevan and Taylor, 1987). The fact that the CVE
is restricted to repeat trials only was also found by Miniussi et al.
(2005),and might be a consequence of anticipatory backward inhi-
bition (Mayr and Keele, 2000; Hübner et al., 2003; Li and Dupuis,
2008): in task switching, backward inhibition refers to the phe-
nomenon that preparation for a task switch leads to inhibition of
the just executed task set, and is hence also a form of proactive
control. There is plenty of evidence that the foreknowledge about
an upcoming task switch suffices to trigger the inhibition of the
preceding task (Mayr and Keele, 2000, Experiment 5; Hübner et al.,
2003; Li and Dupuis, 2008; Wendt et al., under review). Applied
to our data, an invalidly cued repetition already caused inhibi-
tion of the previous task resulting in performance costs when this
very task unexpectedly repeats. In invalidly cued switches, on the
other hand, the cue predicts a repetition and as such does not trig-
ger backward inhibition resulting in typical switch costs – like in
validly cued switches. In sum, Experiment 3 succeeded in show-
ing that specifically proactive control and not reactive control is
modulated by positive affect: Switch costs – as a measure of reac-
tive control – were comparable in all three affect groups in the
first block without task cues. Positive affect along with high or
FIGURE 3 | Mean RTs (in ms) in the first task switching block with informative task cues of Experiment 3 as a function of Affect group,Trial type, and
Cue validity. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean.
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low arousal did neither improve nor impair the adaption to a
(unexpected) task switch. In contrast, the CVE – as a measure of
proactive control – was again modulated by affect, and indicated
a reduction of proactive control in the positivelow group.
Together with results from Experiments 1 and 2, we thus found
converging evidence that performance under positive affect with
low arousal is less dependent on informative cues, indicating a
reduction in proactive control. Positive affect with high arousal,
on the other hand, seems to increase the usage of informative cues.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Purpose of the present study was to investigate the influence of
positive affect on processes of proactive control under different
arousal conditions. According to the DMC framework (Braver
et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) cognitive control can be divided into
proactive and reactive control: proactive control means sustained
preparation for an upcoming event – for example, by using infor-
mative cues to optimize performance, while reactive control means
a just-in-time activation of control as soon as a demanding event
appears. In three experiments with different paradigms and kinds
of informative cues, we found converging evidence that positive
affect with low arousal – induced via short presentation of affective
pictures – reduces the CVE. These results replicate and extend pre-
vious findings (Compton et al., 2004; Dreisbach, 2006) by showing
that only positive affect with low arousal but not positive affect
with high arousal reduces the usage of informative cues, and by
showing that these effects are not limited to response cues but can
be generalized to task cues (for limitations see Discussion of Exper-
iment 3). Furthermore, results on task switching performance in
Experiment 3 strongly suggest that positive affect does not mod-
ulate reactive control (see also Discussion of Experiment 2 and
Footnote 4) by showing that switch costs were not manipulated by
affect. Taken together, the results of Experiments 1–3 support the
assumption that specifically positive affect with low arousal leads
to a reduction in proactive control.
In Experiment 3, we found comparable switch costs in both
positive groups and the neutral group suggesting that reactive
control was not modulated by affect. At first sight, this seems to
be at odds with findings by Dreisbach and Goschke (2004), who
found interactions of switch costs and positive affect. Their study,
however, did not use a classical task switching paradigm but a cog-
nitive set-switching paradigm. In this paradigm, participants did
not have to switch between different tasks, but performed a single
task only: they had to categorize a target presented in one color,
while ignoring a simultaneously presented distractor in another
color. Dreisbach and Goschke investigated two switching condi-
tions of cognitive sets: After the switch, either the targets appeared
in a new color, while the former target color become the distractor
color (perseveration condition), or the distractors appeared in a
new color,while the former distractor color became the target color
(learned irrelevance condition). Positive affect diminished switch
costs when switching to a new cognitive set (perseveration condi-
tion), but increased switch costs and interference by distractors in
the learned irrelevance condition. Dreisbach and Goschke inter-
preted these very specific interactions between positive affect and
switch costs as evidence for increased cognitive flexibility accom-
panied by costs of increased distractibility under positive affect.
The task switches in Experiment 3 of this study, however, can not
be differentiated by these two switching conditions. Therefore, it is
no surprise that no affective modulation of switch costs was found
here. However, the reduced CVE might just as well be interpreted
as an index of increased cognitive flexibility. For example, Comp-
ton et al. (2004) argued that a reduced CVE can be interpreted in
terms of more flexibility because the behavior is less dependent on
the cue information.
The CVE was significantly smaller in the positivelow compared
to the positivehigh group in both the response cueing (Experiments
1 and 2) as well as the cued task switching paradigm (Experiment
3), while the CVE in the neutral group was roughly between both
positive groups (see Figure 4). But in spite of these descriptive
differences between the neutral group and both positive groups,
there was only once – in Experiment 2 – also a significant reduc-
tion of the CVE in the positivelow group compared to the neutral
group (while the magnitude of the CVE was equally high in the
neutral and the positivehigh group). This lack of significant differ-
ences might be a byproduct of our procedure: each experiment
started with a short relaxation exercise to create a similar base-
line mood in all participants. This procedure, however, might
already have resulted in a mild positive affect induction, thereby
possibly reducing the differences between the neutral group and
the positive group especially with low arousal. Admittedly, what
speaks against this assumption is that in Experiment 2, the CVE
of the neutral group actually resembled the positivehigh group. It
is, however, conceivable that the higher task demands due to the
additional math task have counteracted the relaxed mood in the
neutral group. Thus, the significant difference found in Experi-
ment 2 might in fact be closer to the actual difference between
neutral affect and positive affect with low arousal. Also, it can
be assumed that everyday mood is generally rather mildly posi-
tive than truly neutral. Therefore, it might not be too surprising
that differences between mild positive affect and neutral affect are
not easily detected. However, with these constraints in mind, the
observed differences in the CVE between positive affect with low
arousal and neutral and positive affect with high arousal provide
sufficient evidence for the conclusion that positive affect with low
arousal decreases proactive control, while positive affect with high
arousal seems to increase proactive control compared to neutral
affect.
The reduced CVE in the positivelow group converges with find-
ings from previous studies by Compton et al. (2004) and Dreisbach
(2006). Compton et al. (2004) investigated associations between
baseline mood state – assessed via the Profile of Mood States
(McNair et al., 1971) – and performance in an attentional ori-
enting task with informative cues. Self-reported negative affect
was unrelated to attentional orienting performance. High positive
affect, however, was associated with a reduced CVE, with slower
responses after validly cued targets and faster responses following
invalidly cued targets, compared to low positive affect. Dreisbach
(2006) used the AX-CPT and found enhanced performance in AY
trials, that is, in invalidly cued trials, but impaired performance
in BX and BY trials, that is, in validly cued trials, under posi-
tive affect as compared to neutral or negative affect. Thus in both
studies, positive affect resulted in a benefit in expected events,
but also in costs in unexpected events. These findings – like our
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FIGURE 4 | Mean Cue validity effects (in ms) as a function of Affect group for Experiment 1 (A), Experiment 2 (B), and Experiment 3 (C). Error bars
represent 1 standard error of the mean.
results – can be explained by a reduced usage of informative cues,
which indicates a reduction in proactive control. But unlike Dreis-
bach (2006) a recent study by van Wouwe et al. (2011) – also using
the AX-CPT – found no influence of positive affect on cue usage
(no impairment in BX and BY trials), and hence proactive con-
trol, but, instead, differences between their positive and neutral
group in reactive control: participants in the positive affect group
showed a performance benefit and ERP differences in AY trials
only, where a pre-dominant response tendency has to be over-
come. In line with these results are also several studies by Kuhl
and colleagues (Kuhl and Kazen, 1999; Baumann and Kuhl, 2005;
Kazén and Kuhl, 2005) that used paradigms without informative
cues, which means that there is not much room for proactive con-
trol. They used the Stroop task and a global-local task and found
a reduction in Stroop interference and a reduced global prece-
dence under positive affect (again no consideration of arousal
differences) indicating also an enhanced ability to overcome pre-
dominant response tendencies. So overall, there is evidence for
increased flexibility in form of a reduction in proactive control (this
study; Compton et al., 2004; Dreisbach, 2006), but also evidence
for increased flexibility in form of a modulation of reactive con-
trol (Kuhl and Kazen, 1999; Baumann and Kuhl, 2005; Kazén and
Kuhl, 2005; van Wouwe et al., 2011). One reason for these mixed
results might be the differential affect induction procedures: the
current study – like the AX-CPT study by Dreisbach – manipulated
affect in a between groups design with affective pictures preced-
ing every trial, Compton et al. investigated differences in baseline
mood state, van Wouwe et al. used emotional film clips previous
to the actual experiment (for a more detailed discussion on dif-
ferences between the two AX-CPT studies see van Wouwe et al.,
2011), and Kuhl and colleagues used a within design with random
presentation of positive, negative, or neutral prime words preced-
ing every trial. So, Compton et al. as well as van Wouwe et al. were
concerned with effects of a sustained mood state – in the former
case the currently existing mood state, in the latter case an induced
mood state – whereas Kuhl and colleagues investigated influences
of rather transient affective reactions. The affect induction pro-
cedure used in our lab (this study; Dreisbach, 2006) – affective
pictures preceding every trial in a between groups design – most
likely resulted in both transient and sustained affective reactions.
IAPS pictures very quickly elicit typical emotional reactions with
changes in cortical, autonomic, and facial activity, as well as eval-
uative ratings even with short presentation durations (Codispoti
et al., 2001, 2009). Furthermore, repetitive exposure to pictures of
the same valence leads to maintained or even sensitized affective
reactions and can therefore be seen as a mood induction procedure
(Bradley et al., 1996; Smith et al., 2005). For the studies reviewed
here, however, the difference between sustained mood states vs.
transient affective reactions does not seem to be a crucial factor
to explain the different outcomes in the affective modulation of
cognitive control. For example, also van Steenbergen et al. (2009)
found consistent positive affect effects on the sequential modula-
tion of response conflicts using either randomized affective signals
between trials (smilies) or specific mood induction in a between
groups design (van Steenbergen et al., 2010). In fact, there are
other procedural factors aside from different affect induction pro-
cedures that might as well be crucial. For example, the reduced
Stroop interference found by Kuhl and colleagues was restricted
to conditions when intention memory is activated, that is, in the
first of two consecutive Stroop tasks in a single trial (Kuhl and
Kazen, 1999) or when using specific positive primes related to
achievement (Kazén and Kuhl, 2005). Also, none of the above-
quoted studies considered differences in arousal levels. But note
that in the Dreisbach (2006) study the positive IAPS pictures had
low arousal levels comparable to the ones used here. In sum, the
existing literature is characterized by mixed results, which might
be explained to some extent by different affect induction proce-
dures – pictures vs. film clips vs. words, between vs. within –,
differences in intention memory load, as well as different arousal
levels. Therefore, future studies are clearly needed to further clar-
ify under which conditions positive affect influences proactive or
reactive control.
The fact, that we found a reliable difference in the CVE between
the positive groups with low and high arousal, demonstrates that it
is most important to consider both dimensions of affect – valence
and arousal (cf., Russell, 1980; Posner et al., 2005). Whether there
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is less attention to the cues or a reduced maintenance of the cue
information in the positivelow group cannot be answered based on
behavioral results alone. But nonetheless, it remains an interest-
ing question why positive affect in combination with low arousal
reduces proactive control, whereas positive affect along with high
arousal seems to increase proactive control. Reduced proactive
control under positive affect with low arousal seems to converge
with our everyday experience: When being in a relaxed, mildly
positive mood one tends to enjoy the moment without looking
ahead. This would also be in line with Carver’s (2003) coast-
ing theory. This theory assumes a feedback function of affect:
more precisely, positive affect signals better progress than neces-
sary, and consequently reduces the effort invested in the ongoing
task (=coasting). Proactive control in this sense is associated with
more effort than reactive control, because it involves sustained
maintenance of informative cues or task goals for an optimized
behavior (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012). Thus, a reduction of
proactive control could be a sign of coasting: Participants in the
positivelow group apply less effort in sustained task preparation,
and instead rely on reactive control alone as soon as the target
appears. This might also explain why the effects of reduced proac-
tive control were restricted to the positive affect group with low
arousal and were not found with high arousal. Obviously, coasting
might not be a reasonable strategy under high arousal as any high
arousal signal might rather serve as a warning or alertness signal.
For example, Fuentes and Campoy (2008) showed in an attention
network task that alerting tones increase the CVE, and inferred
that alerting enhances the effect of informative cues. A similar
explanation presents the integrative theory of locus coeruleus-
norephinephrine function (LC-NE) by Aston-Jones and Cohen
(2005). Arousal is associated with NE activity, and according to
the integrative LC-NE theory specifically phasic LC-NE activity
promotes exploitative behavior that helps to optimize task per-
formance. Applied to our data, the short presentation of highly
arousing positive pictures might have triggered phasic NE activity
and thereby resulted in increased proactive control in form of a
stronger usage of the informative cue, and, as a consequence, an
increased CVE.5
CONCLUSION
The DMC framework (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) assumes
that there are various factors that induce a bias in favor of one type
of control strategy over the other. Taken together, Experiments 1–3
resulted in converging evidence that positive affect is such a fac-
tor. Specifically, positive affect with low arousal led to a reduction
in proactive control in form of a reduced reliance on informative
cues. On the other hand, positive affect in combination with high
arousal increased the CVE and therefore seems to promote proac-
tive control. Reactive control, in contrast, was not influenced by
positive affect.
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APPENDIX
Numbers of affective picture stimuli (Lang et al., 1999).
Neutral: 7000, 7004, 7006, 7009, 7035, 7040, 7080, 7090, 7175, 7233.
Positivelow: 1440, 1710, 1750, 1920, 2057, 2150, 2260, 2311, 2340, 2530.
Positivehigh: 5260, 5621, 5623, 5626, 5629, 8161, 8180, 8190, 8200, 8490.
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